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Abstract
In wiretap channels the eavesdropper’s channel state information (CSI) is commonly assumed to be known
at transmitter, fully or partially. However, under perfect secrecy constraint the eavesdropper may not be motivated
to feedback any correct CSI. In this paper we consider a more feasible problem for the transmitter to have
eavesdropper’s CSI. That is, the fast fading multiple-antenna Gaussian broadcast channels (FMGBC-CM) with
confidential messages, where both receivers are legitimate users such that they both are willing to feedback accurate
CSI to maintain their secure transmission, and not to be eavesdropped by the other. We assume that only the
statistics of the channel state information are known by the transmitter. We first show the necessary condition
for the FMGBC-CM not to be degraded to the common wiretap channels. Then we derive the achievable rate
region for the FMGBC-CM where the channel input covariance matrices and the inflation factor are left unknown
and to be solved. After that we provide an analytical solution to the channel input covariance matrices. We also
propose an iterative algorithm to solve the channel input covariance matrices and the inflation factor. Due to the
complicated rate region formulae in normal SNR, we resort to low SNR analysis to investigate the characteristics
of the channel. Finally, numerical examples show that under perfect secrecy constraint both users can achieve
positive rates simultaneously, which verifies our derived necessary condition. Numerical results also elucidate the
effectiveness of the analytical solution and proposed algorithm of the channel input covariance matrices and the
inflation factor under different conditions.
2In wiretap channels the eavesdropper’s channel state information (CSI) is commonly assumed to be
known at transmitter, fully or partially. However, under perfect secrecy constraint the eavesdropper may
not be motivated to feedback any correct CSI. In this paper we consider a more feasible problem for
the transmitter to have eavesdropper’s CSI. That is, the fast fading multiple-antenna Gaussian broadcast
channels (FMGBC-CM) with confidential messages, where both receivers are legitimate users such that
they both are willing to feedback accurate CSI to maintain their secure transmission, and not to be
eavesdropped by the other. We assume that only the statistics of the channel state information are known
by the transmitter. We first show the necessary condition for the FMGBC-CM not to be degraded to the
common wiretap channels. Then we derive the achievable rate region for the FMGBC-CM. After that
we propose an iterative algorithm to solve the channel input covariance matrices and the inflation factor.
Finally, numerical examples show that under perfect secrecy constraint both users can achieve positive
rates simultaneously, which verifies our derived necessary condition. Numerical results also elucidate the
effectiveness of the proposed algorithm in convergence speed.
I. INTRODUCTION
Traditionally, the security of data transmission has been ensured by the key-based enciphering. However,
for secure communication in large-scale wireless networks, the key distributions and managements may be
challenging tasks [1] [2]. The physical-layer security introduced in [3] [4] is appealing due to its keyless
nature. One of the fundamental setting for the physical-layer security is the wiretap channel. In this channel,
the transmitter wishes to send messages securely to a legitimate receiver and to keep the eavesdropper
as ignorant of the message as possible. Wyner first characterized the secrecy capacity of the discrete
memoryless wiretap channel [3]. The secrecy capacity is the largest rate communicated between the
source and legitimate receiver with the eavesdropper knowing no information of the messages. Motivated
by the demand of high data rate transmission, the multiple antenna systems with security concern were
considered by several works. In [5], Shafiee and Ulukus first proved the secrecy capacity of a Gaussian
channel with two-input, two-output, single-antenna-eavesdropper. Then the authors of [6]–[8] extended
3the secrecy capacity result to the Gaussian multiple-input multiple-output, multiple-antenna-eavesdropper
channel. On the other hand, the impacts of fading channels on the secure transmission were considered in
[9]. Note that [5]–[9] require full channel state information at the transmitter (CSIT). When there is only
partial CSIT, several works considered the secure transmission under this condition [10]–[14]. The artificial
noise (AN) assisted secure beamforming is a promising technique for the partial CSIT cases, where in
addition to the message-bearing signal, an AN is intentionally transmitted to disrupt the eavesdropper’s
reception [10] [11]. Indeed, adding AN in transmission is crucial in increasing the secrecy rate in fading
wiretap channels. However, the covariance matrices of AN in [11] [10] is heuristically selected without
optimization, and the resulting secrecy rate is not optimal. In [12], the secure transmission under fast
fading channels with only statistical CSIT and without AN is considered. Although the secrecy capacity
for single antenna system with partial CSIT was found in [14], the decoding latency of the transmission
scheme proposed in [14] is much longer than the common fast fading channels, e.g., [10]–[13], and may
be unacceptable in practice.
However, the assumptions of wiretap channels with full or partial CSIT may not be practical. That is,
the eavesdroppers needs to feedback the perfect/statistical CSI to transmitter or the transmitter needs to
know this CSI by some means. On the contrary, the eavesdroppers may not be motivated to feedback
this information. Furthermore, the eavesdroppers may feedback the wrong CSI to destroy the secure
transmission. Thus in this paper, we consider the multiple antenna Gaussian broadcast channel with
confidential messages (MGBC-CM) [15] under fast fading channels (abbreviated as FMGBC-CM). In the
FMGBC-CM, both receivers are legitimate users such that they both are willing to feedback accurate CSI
to maintain their secure transmission, and not to be eavesdropped by the other user. In the considered
FMGBC-CM, we assume that the transmitter only has the statistics of the channels from both receivers.
This is to taking the practical issues into account, such as the limited bandwidth of the feedback channels
or the speed of the channel estimation at the receivers. And to the best knowledge of the authors, this
problem has not been considered in the literature.
4The main contribution of this paper is to provide an achievable rate region with explicit channel input
covariance matrices of both users. An iterative algorithm is proposed to solve the inflation factor of the
linear assignment Gel’fand-Pinsker coding (LA-GPC) [16] used in the adopted transmission scheme. To
accomplish these, we first classify the non-trivial cases such that the FMGBC-CM is not degraded as
the conventional wiretap channel, i.e., both users have positive secure transmission rates, by the same
marginal property. We then prove that the MISO GBC-CM with identical and independently distributed
(i.i.d.) Rayleigh fading channels is degraded as the MISO Gaussian wiretap channel. Thus in this paper
we consider the non-i.i.d. Rayleigh fading MISO and Rician fading MISO BC-CM, respectively.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II we introduce the considered system model.
We then provide the necessary conditions for the FMGBC-CM to be not degraded as a conventional wiretap
channel in Section III. In Section IV, we derive the achievable secrecy rate region of the FMGBC-CM.
An achievable selection of the channel input covariance matrices and an iterative scheme for solving
the inflation factor are also provided to calculate the explicit rate region. In Section VI, we demonstrate
the secrecy rate region in low SNR regime and the optimal signaling. In Section VII we illustrate the
numerical results. Finally, Section VIII concludes this paper.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
In this paper we consider the FMGBC-CM system as shown in Fig. 1, where the transmitter has nT
antennas and the receiver 1 and 2 each has single antenna. The received signals at the jth receivers, j =
51 or 2, can be respectively represented as ∗
Yj,k = H j,kHX k +N j,k, (1)
where X k ∈ CnT×1 is the transmit vector, k is the time index, respectively, H j,k denotes the fading vector
channels from the transmitter to the jth receiver, and N j,k is the circularly symmetric complex additive
white Gaussian noise with variances one at receiver j, respectively. In this system, we assume that only
the statistics of both channels are known at transmitter, to take the practical system design issues into
account, such as the limited bandwidth of the feedback channels or the speed of the channel estimation
at the receivers. We also assume that both the receivers perfectly know all channel vectors. Without loss
of generality, in the following we omit the time index to simplify the notation. We consider the power
constraint as
tr(E[X X H ])≤ PT .
The perfect secrecy and secrecy capacity are defined as follows. Consider a (2nR1,2nR2,n)-code with an
encoder that maps the message W1 ∈W1 = {1,2, . . . ,2nR1} and W2 ∈W2 = {1,2, . . . ,2nR2} into a length-n
codeword, and receiver 1 and receiver 2 map the received sequence Y n1 and Y n2 (the collections of Y1
and Y2, respectively, over code length n) from the MISO channel to the estimated message ˆW1 ∈W1 and
ˆW2 ∈ W2, respectively. Since H 1 and H 2 are both known at receiver 1 and 2, respectively, we can treat
them as the channel outputs similar to [17]. We then have the following definition of secrecy capacity
region.
∗In this paper, lower and upper case bold alphabets denote vectors and matrices, respectively. Italic upper alphabets with and without
boldface denote random vectors and variables, respectively. The ith element of vector a is denoted by ai. The superscript (.)H denotes
the transpose complex conjugate. The superscript ac denotes the complement of a. |A| and |a| represent the determinant of the square
matrix A and the absolute value of the scalar variable a, respectively. A diagonal matrix whose diagonal entries are a1 . . .ak is denoted by
diag(a1 . . .ak). The trace of A is denoted by tr(A). We define C(x) , log(1+ x) and (x)+ , max{0, x}. The mutual information between
two random variables is denoted by I(;). In denotes the n by n identity matrix. A ≻ 0 and A  0 denote that A is a positive definite and
positive semi-definite matrix, respectively.
6Definition 1 (Secrecy capacity region): Perfect secrecy with rate pair (R1, R2) is achievable if, for any
positive ε and ε′, there exists a sequence of (2nR1,2nR2,n)-codes and an integer n0 such that for any n> n0
I(Wj;Y njc,H njc)/n < ε,and Pr( ˆWj 6=Wj)≤ ε′, (2)
where H n1 and H n2 are the collections of H 1 and H 2 over code length n, respectively. The secrecy capacity
region is the closure of the set of all achievable rate pairs (R1, R2).
Note that as shown in the footnote, italic upper alphabets with and without boldface denote random
vectors and variables, respectively. By treating H 1 and H 2 as the channel outputs, we can extend the
achievable rate region of the discrete memoryless MBC-CM from [15] as
(R1,R2) ∈ co
{
⋃
ϖ∈Ω
RI(ϖ)
}
,
where co{.} denotes the convex closure; RI(ϖ) denotes the union of all (R1,R2) satisfying
R j ≤ (I(V j;Yj,H j,H cj)− I(V j;Y cj ,H j,H cj,V cj))+, (3)
for any given joint probability density ϖ belonging to the class of joint probability densities
p(v1,v2,x,y1,y2,h1,h2), denoted by Ω, that factor as p(v1,v2)p(x|v1,v2)p(y1,y2,h1,h2|x); V 1 and V 2 are
the auxiliary random vectors for user 1 and 2, respectively.
Note that we can further rearrange the right hand side (RHS) of (3) with j = 1 as
R1
(a)
≤(I(V 1;Y1,H 1,H 2)− I(V 1;V 2,H 1,H 2)− I(V 1;Y2|V 2,H 1,H 2))+
(b)
=(I(V 1;Y1,H 1,H 2)− I(V 1;V 2)− I(V 1;Y2|V 2,H 1,H 2))+
(c)
=(I(V 1;Y1|H 1,H 2)+ I(V 1;H 1,H 2)− I(V 1;Y2|V 2,H 1,H 2)− I(V 1;V 2))+
(d)
=(I(V 1;Y1|H 1,H 2)− I(V 1;Y2|V 2,H 1,H 2)− I(V 1;V 2))+, (4)
where (a) is by applying the chain rule of mutual information to the second term on the RHS of (3);
(b) is due to V 1 and V 2 are independent of H 2; (c) is again applying the chain rule to the first term; (d)
is due to the fact that since there is only statistical CSIT, V 1 is independent of H 1. Thus I(V 1;H 1) = 0.
7Similarly, we can rearrange R2 as
R2 ≤ (I(V 2;Y2|H 1,H 2)− I(V 2;Y1|V 1,H 1,H 2)− I(V 1;V 2))+. (5)
III. CONDITIONS FOR NON-DEGRADED FMGBC-CM
In this section, we explain our first main result of this paper which helps to characterize the secrecy rate
region, i.e., the necessary conditions to exclude the cases that one of the two receivers of FMGBC-CM
always has zero rate. Note that if such cases happens, the FMGBC-CM degrades as a normal fast fading
wiretap channel. And the achievable rates or capacities of fast fading wiretap channels with different
degree of knowledge of CSIT are widely discussed, e.g., [11] [13] [12] [14] [18]. Note that with only
the statistical CSIT of both main and eavesdropper’s channel, the capacity and optimal signaling of the
fast fading wiretap channel were found in [18]. Note also that the wiretap channel is a special case of
the GBC-CM which can be easily derived by letting W2 in the GBC-CM as null. The phenomenon of
channel degradation was also observed in [19] for the less noisy GBC-CM case with full CSIT, which
is a general case of the SISO GBC-CM. However, it is much more involved to analyze the channel
degradation phenomenon for partial CSIT, i.e., the same marginal property needs to be re-examined. Thus
before illustrating our first main result, we need to introduce the following same marginal lemma first,
which is critical to the result. Since Lemma 1 can be easily extended from [15, Lemma 4] by treating the
CSI as the channel output [17], we do not expose the proof here.
Lemma 1: Let P denote the set of channels p(y˜1, y˜2, ˜h1, ˜h2|x) whose marginal distributions satisfy
p
˜Y1, ˜H1|X (y˜1,
˜h1|x) = pY1,H1|X (y1,h1|x), (6)
p
˜Y2, ˜H2|X (y˜2,
˜h2|x) = pY2,H2|X (y2,h2|x), (7)
for all y1, y2, and x. The secrecy capacity region is the same for all channels p(y˜1, y˜2, ˜h1, ˜h2|x) ∈ P .
Note that p(y˜1, y˜2, ˜h1, ˜h2|x) can be factorized as the statement below (3). Then our first result is as
following.
8Lemma 2: A necessary condition for both users in the fast Rayleigh FMGBC-CM having positive rates
is that the covariance matrices of H 1 and H 2 are not scaled of each other.
Proof: We prove it by contradiction. Assume that the two channels are distributed as H 1 ∼CN(0,σ21Σ)
and H 2 ∼CN(0,σ22Σ), i.e., the covariance matrices are scaled of each other. Due to the same marginal
property in Lemma 1, we can replace H 1 in (1) by ˜H 1 = (σ1/σ2)H 2 without affecting the capacity. After
that we have a new pair of channels with the same capacity as (1)
Y ′1 = (σ1/σ2)H
H
2 X +N1, Y2 = H H2 X +N2,
which can be further represented as
Y ′′1 = H
H
2 X +(σ2/σ1)N1, Y2 = H H2 X +N2.
Thus as long as σ1 > σ2, we can have the Markov chain X →Y ′′1 →Y2. On the other hand, by extending
the outer bound of [19, Theorem 3], we know that less noisy [20, Ch. 5] makes one of the two-user
FMGBC-CM have zero rate. Since Y2 is degraded of Y ′′1 , and the degradedness property is stricter than
the less noisy, we can conclude that R2 = 0. Similarly, when σ2 > σ1, R1 = 0.
An intuitive explanation is that, if a message can be successfully decoded by the inferior user, then
the superior user is also ensured of decoding it. Thus the secrecy rate of the degraded user is zero.
Therefore to avoid the investigation of such cases, in the following we assume H 1 ∼CN(µ1,KH1) and
H 2 ∼CN(µ2,KH2), where KH1 and KH2 may not be scaled of each other. Two special cases with single
input single output (SISO) antenna GBC-CM are also summarized as follows.
Corollary 1: All SISO fast Rayleigh fading GBC-CMs with only statistical CSIT degrade as wiretap
channels.
Corollary 2: All SISO fast Rician fading GBC-CMs with only statistical CSIT degrade as wiretap
channels if the channels have the same K-factor.
Remark: To prove the degradedness of the FMGBC-CM, another way is to directly verifying the less
9noisy [20] property, i.e., I(V k,Y1)> I(V k,Y2) or I(V k,Y1)< I(V k,Y2), where k = 1, 2, from extending the
upper bound derivation in [19, Theorem 3, Example 1] to multiple antenna case. However, the derivation
is intractable.
IV. THE ACHIEVABLE SECRECY RATE REGION OF FMGBC-CM
Due to the fact that there is only statistical CSIT, we can not use the original minimum mean square
error (MMSE) inflation factor as Costa [21], where the exact channel state information is required. Thus
we need to re-derive the achievable rate region of the FMGBC-CM instead of directly using Liu’s result
in [15, Lemma 3]. To derive the new achievable rate region, we resort to the linear assignment Gel’fand-
Pinsker coding (LA-GPC) [16] [22] with Gaussian codebooks, which is the generalized case of DPC, to
deal with the fading channels. First, separate the channel input X into two random vectors U 1 and U 2 so
that X =U 1 +U 2. Then U 1 and U 2 are chosen as
U 1 ∼CN(0,KU 1),U 2 ∼CN(0,KU 2), (8)
where U 2 is independent of U 1, KU 1  0 and KU 2  0 are the covariance matrices of U 1 and U 2,
respectively. After that, we do the decomposition KU 1 = T1TH1 , and define U ′1 ∼CN(0,IN) so that U 1 =
T1U ′1, where T1 ∈CnT×N and N is the rank of KU 1 . The auxiliary random variables of LA-GPC are then
defined as
V 1 =U ′1 +aH H1 U 2, (9)
V 2 =U 2, (10)
where a is the inflation factor in LA-GPC. The reason of choosing (9) is that, if we do LA-GPC for U 1
directly, i.e., V 1 =U 1+aH H1 U 2, but not (9). After substituting it into the RHS of (3) and (5), we can find
that when calculating I(V 1;V 2), the term the term log |KU 1| requires KU 1 ≻ 0 but not KU 1  0. However,
the expression of (9) would avoid this constraint. Note that in the rest of this paper, for convenience the
of derivation, we combine aH H1 as b. To present the rate regions compactly, recall that the permutation
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pi specifies the encoding order, i.e., the message of user pi2 is encoded first while the message of user pi1
is encoded second. Then we can have the following secrecy rate region.
Lemma 3: Let R (KU pi1 ,KU pi2 ) denote the union of all rate pairs (Rpi1,Rpi2) satisfying
Rpi1 ≤
(
EHpi1 [log(1+H pi1
H(KU pi1 +KU pi2 )H pi1)]−△
)+
, (11)
Rpi2 ≤
(
EHpi2 [log(1+H pi2
H(KU pi1 +KU pi2 )H pi2)]−△
)+
, (12)
where
△, EHpi2 [log(1+H pi2
HKU pi1 H pi2)]+EHpi1

log
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
I+bKUpi2 b
H (THpi1 +bKUpi2 )H pi1
H pi1
H(Tpi1 +KU pi2 b
H) 1+H pi1H(KU pi1 +KU pi2 )H pi1
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣


(13)
, EHpi2 [log(1+H pi2
HKU pi1 H pi2)]+EHpi1[log |M|] . (14)
Then any rate pair
(R1,R2) ∈ co


⋃
tr(KU pi1+KU pi2 )≤PT
R (KU pi1 ,KU pi2 )


is achievable for the FMGBC-CM.
The proof is provided in Appendix IX. In the following, we provide an achievable scheme to approximately
achieve the above two bounds in (11) and (12). Assume H pik ∼CN(µpik , KH pik ), k = 1,2.
Lemma 4: With the selection K∗U pi1 = αPT e
∗
pi1(e
∗
pi1)
H and K∗U pi2 = (1−α)PT e
∗
pi2(e
∗
pi2)
H
, where ||e∗pi1||
2 =
||e∗pi2||
2 = 1, and
e∗pi1 = argmaxepi1
eHpi1
(
I+αPT
(
KHpi1 +µpi1µ
H
pi1
))
epi1
eHpi1
(
I+αPT
(
KHpi2 +µpi2µ
H
pi2
))
epi1
, (15)
e∗pi2 = argmaxepi2
eHpi2
(
I+
(1−α)PT
(
KHpi2+µpi2µ
H
pi2
)
1+αPT (e∗pi1 )
H
(
KHpi2+µpi2µ
H
pi2
)
e∗pi1
)
epi2
eHpi2
(
I+
(1−α)PT
(
KHpi1+µpi1µ
H
pi1
)
1+αPT (e∗pi1 )
H
(
KHpi1+µpi1µ
H
pi1
)
e∗pi1
)
epi2
, (16)
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where α is the ratio of power allocated to user pi1, we can get the non-trivial rate region for the FMGBC-
CM as
(R1,R2) ∈ co
{
⋃
0≤α≤1
R (K∗U pi1 ,K
∗
U pi2
)
}
.
The proof is provided in Appendix X. Note that with [23, Property 2 and 3] it can be proved that when
the number of transmit antenna is 2 with KHpi1 −KH pi2 being non-positive semi-definite, unit rank KU pi1
and KU pi2 are optimal for the considered upper bounds of R1 and R2 in the proof of Lemma 4.
After deriving the covariance matrices, we then need to solve the inflation factor due to the fact that
there is no full CSIT. Here we resort to the following fixed point iteration to solve b
b =−(EHpi1 [A
H
1 ])
−1EHpi1 [A
H
2 H
H
1 ], f (b),

 A1
A2

, M−1

 I
0

 , (17)
where M is defined as the block matrix inside the determinant of the second term in (14). Note that (17)
is derived by ∂R1/∂b = 0. Note also that the iteration stops when the maximum of the absolute values of
the relative errors of R1 and R2 in the successive iterations is less than a predefined value. The iteration
steps are summarized in Table I.
TABLE I
THE ITERATIVE STEPS FOR SOLVING b.
Step 1 Set i = 0 and initialize b(i) = 0. Also initialize epi1 and epi2 as
(15) and (16), respectively.
Step 2 Evaluate b(i+1) = f (b(i)) as (17).
Step 3 Let i = i+1 and repeat Step 2 until
max
{∣∣∣R(i)1 −R(i−1)1 ∣∣∣, ∣∣∣R(i)2 −R(i−1)2 ∣∣∣}< δ1.
V. THE ITERATIVE ALGORITHM
From Lemma 3 we can observe that the achievable rate region requires the joint optimization of the
inflation factor and input covariance matrices, i.e., b, KU pi1 , and KU pi2 , or equivalently, b, Tpi1 , and Tpi2 .
12
However, the largest rate region is in general difficult to find unless we prove it reaches the upper bound
of the capacity region. Instead, here we develop an algorithm to provide a sub-optimal solution for
this optimization problem. To be more specific, given the ratio of total power allocated to user pi1, i.e.,
α = tr(Tpi1THpi1)/PT and the achievable rate region as the union of (11) and (12) among all α ∈ [0,1], we
instead resort to solving the following two optimization problems P1 and P2, iteratively
P1 : max
b,Tpi1
RUBpi1 , s.t. tr(Tpi1T
H
pi1)≤ αPT , (18)
P2 : max
Tpi2
RUBpi2 , s.t. tr(Tpi2T
H
pi2)≤ (1−α)PT , (19)
where RUBpi1 and R
UB
pi2 are the RHS of the rate formulae in (11) and (12), respectively, and in problems P1
and P2, Tpi2 and (Tpi1, b) are given, respectively.
In the following, we show the functions in terms of b, KU pi1 , and KU pi2 , which will be used to develop
the proposed fixed point iterative algorithm in solving P1 and P2 later, derived from the Karush-Kuhn-
Tucker (K.K.T.) conditions.
Lemma 5: The K.K.T. necessary conditions of the optimization problems P1 and P2 can be formed
as f1(b,Tpi1 ,Tpi2) = b, g1(b,Tpi1,Tpi2) = λ1Tpi1 , g2(b,Tpi1 ,Tpi2) = λ2Tpi2 , where λ1 and λ2 are Lagrange
multipliers of the Lagrangians corresponding to (18) and (19), respectively, and f1, g1, and g2 are defined
as
f1(b,Tpi1 ,Tpi2) ∆=− (EHpi1 [AH1 ])−1EHpi1 [AH2 H Hpi1 ],
g1(b,Tpi1 ,Tpi2)
∆
=EHpi1
[
H pi1
(
1+H Hpi1(KU pi1+KU pi2)H pi1
)−1
H Hpi1Tpi1
]
−EH pi2
[
H pi2
(
1+H Hpi2KU pi1 H pi2
)−1
H Hpi2Tpi1
]
−EH pi1

[0 H pi1]M−H

 I
H Hpi1Tpi1



 ,
g2(b,Tpi1 ,Tpi2)
∆
=EHpi2
[
hpi2
(
1+H Hpi2(KU pi1+KU pi2 )H pi2
)−1
H Hpi2Tpi2
]
−EH pi1


[
bH H pi1
]
M−H

 b
H Hpi1

Tpi2

 ,
where A1, A2, and M are defined in (17).
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The proof is given in Sec XI. Obviously, the analytical solutions for the equations f1, g1, and g2 are
intractable. We then rather propose an iterative algorithm to solve this joint optimization problem, which
is summarized in the following.
Step 1. Initialize b(0), T(0)pi1 and T
(0)
pi2 randomly, such that tr
(
T(0)pi1
(
T(0)pi1
)H)
+tr
(
T(0)pi2
(
T(0)pi2
)H)
≤ PT .
Step 2. For the (i+1)-th iteration,
2.A. Initialize b(0)in = b(i) and run iterations b
( j+1)
in = f1
(
b( j)in ,T
(i)
pi1 ,T
(i)
pi2
)
till |b( j+1)in −b
( j)
in | ≤ ε1. Then
set b(i+1) as the fixed point solution of bin.
2.B. Initialize T(0)pi1, in =T
(i)
pi1 . Run iterations till |T
( j+1)
pi1, in −T
( j)
pi1, in | ≤ ε2: T
( j+1)
pi1, in =
1
λ( j+1)1
g1
(
b(i+1),T( j)pi1, in ,T
(i)
pi2
)
and set T( j+1)pi1, in = 0.5T
( j+1)
pi1, in +0.5T
( j)
pi1, in . The Lagrange multiplier is calculated by
λ( j+1)1 =
√√√√tr(g1(b(i+1),T( j)pi1, in ,T(i)pi2)(g1(b(i+1),T( j)pi1, in ,T(i)pi2))H
)/
tr
(
T( j)pi1, in
(
T( j)pi1, in
)H)
. Then
set T(i+1)pi1 as the fixed point solution of Tpi1, in .
2.C. Initialize T(0)pi2, in =T
(i)
pi2 . Run iterations till |T
( j+1)
pi2, in −T
( j)
pi2, in | ≤ ε3: T
( j+1)
pi2, in =
1
λ( j+1)2
g2
(
b(i+1),T(i+1)pi1 ,T
( j)
pi2, in
)
and set T( j+1)pi2, in = 0.5T
( j+1)
pi2, in +0.5T
( j)
pi2, in . The Lagrange multiplier is calculated by
λ( j+1)2 =
√√√√tr(g2(b(i+1),T(i+1)pi1 ,T( j)pi2, in)(g2(b(i+1),T(i+1)pi1 ,T( j)pi2, in))H
)/
tr
(
T( j)pi2, in
(
T( j)pi2, in
)H)
. Then
set T(i+1)pi2 as the fixed point solution of Tpi2, in .
Step 3. Repeat Step 2. until
max
{∣∣∣RUB,(i+1)pi1 −RUB,(i)pi1 ∣∣∣, ∣∣∣RUB,(i+1)pi2 −RUB,(i)pi2 ∣∣∣}≤ δ.
The above steps are also summarized in Fig.2. Note that each step among Step 2.A to Step 2.C has a local
iterative process with intermediate variables bin, Tpi1, in , and Tpi2, in , respectively. Note also that in Step 2.B
and 2.C, we update Tpi1, in and Tpi2, in with moving average. The reason is that without the moving average
the original algorithm is sensitive to initial values and may be easily trapped in a bad solution. However,
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this condition can be improved with such modification.
VI. LOW SNR ANALYSIS
In this section we study the achievable secrecy rate region in the low-SNR regime. The motivations of
this study are as following. First, note that operation at low SNRs is beneficial from a security perspective
since it is generally difficult for an eavesdropper to detect the signal. Second, it is well-known that for
fading Gaussian channels subject to average input power constraints, energy efficiency improves as one
operates at low SNR level, and the minimum bit energy is achieved as SNR vanished [24]. Therefore,
with the aid low SNR analysis we can determine the best energy efficiency of our model, which can be
measured by the minimum energy required to send one information bit reliably. Finally, due to the rate
region in Lemma 3 is too complicated to analyze and by asymptotic analysis the rate formulae of most
channels can be highly simplified, we resort to the low SNR regime to get some insights of the optimality
of choosing the input covariance matrices as unit rank . In the following, we first characterize the secrecy
rate region of FMGBC-CM under low SNR regime. Then we analyze the minimum bit energy. For the
convenience of discussion, in the following we assume that the channel is fast Rayleigh faded, which can
be easily extended to the Rician channels.
Lemma 6: In the low SNR regime, the optimal input covariance matrices KU 1 and KU 2 are both
unit rank, with the directions aligned to the eigenvector corresponding to the maximum eigenvalues of
KH1 −KH2 and KH2 −KH1 , respectively. And the asymptote of the secrecy rate region is
R1 ≤
(
αP
ln2λmax(KH1 −KH2)
)+
, (20)
R2 ≤
(
(1−α)P
ln2
λmax(KH2 −KH1)
)+
. (21)
Before proving Lemma 6, we need the following lemma which provides some useful mathematical
properties for the proof.
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Lemma 7: Given a symmetric matrix An×n and assume Mn×n  0. The optimal M which maximizes
tr(AM) under the constraint tr(M)≤ 1 is unit rank. Furthermore, the eigenvector of the optimal M is the
one corresponding to the maximum eigenvalue of A.
The proofs of Lemma 6 and Lemma 7 are given in Sec. XII and Sec. XIII, respectively. Note that the
unit rank result in Lemma 6 is consistent to that of MGBC-CM with perfect CSIT, also our selection of
K∗U pi1 and K
∗
U pi2
in Lemma 4. Besides, the rate region described in (20) and (21) also implies that
Corollary 3: In the low SNR regime, both users can have positive rates simultaneously if and only if
KH1 −KH2 is indefinite.
Note that in the low SNR regime we can have a stronger result as Corollary 3 than Lemma 2 in the
normal SNR regime, in the sense that Corollary 3 is a necessary and sufficient condition. In the last
part of this section, we would like to measure the best energy efficiency of our model, i.e. the minimum
bit energy. As mentioned previously, this happens when SNR approaches to zero (or equivalently, signal
power P approximates to zero with fixed noise power N0) [25], which is defined as(
Eb
N0
)
min
, lim
P→0
P
R(P)
=
1
˙R(0)
. (22)
The above equality comes from the fact that limP→0 R(P) = ˙R(0)P+O(P2), where ˙R(0) denotes the first
derivative of R at P = 0. Hence, after substituting the results of (20) and (21) into (22), we have(
Es,SCSITb
N0
)
R1, min
=
1
˙R1(0)
=
ln2
λmax
,
(
Es,SCSITb
N0
)
R2, min
=
1
˙R2(0)
=
ln2
λmin
, (23)
where λmax and λmin denote the maximum and minimum eigenvalues of KH1 −KH2 , respectively; the
superscript s, SCSIT denotes the secure communications with statistical CSIT (SCSIT).
To elucidate how the perfect secrecy constraint affects the best energy efficiency, we first compare the
minimum bit energy of communications with and without secrecy constraints. Note that for convenience,
in the following we only consider the best energy efficiency of User 1, and the results of User 2 can
be directly extended. Following the similar derivation of Lemma 6, the rates for communications in low
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SNR without secrecy constraint can be easily obtained as ln2λmax(KH1 ) . Thus we have(
Es,SCSITb
N0
)
R1, min
=
ln2
λmax(KH1 −KH2)
≥
ln2
λmax(KH1)
=
(
ESCSITb
N0
)
R1, min
, (24)
where
(
ESCSITb
N0
)
R1, min
denote the optimal energy efficiency under SCSIT for communication without
secrecy constraints. And the above inequality comes from the fact that for matrices A < 0 and B < 0,
λmax(A−B)≤ λmax(A)−λmin(B)≤ λmax(A). From the results, as expected, we can conclude that secrecy
constraints increase the bit-energy requirements. And the increment is(
Es,SCSITb
N0
)
R1, min
−
(
ESCSITb
N0
)
R1, min
= ln2
(
1
λmax(KH1 −KH2)
−
1
λmax(KH1)
)
Finally, we demonstrate the impact of the knowledge of CSIT to best energy efficiency. The minimum bit
energy for full CSIT case is ln2
(
EH1,H2
[(
λmax(H 1H H1 −H 2H H2 )
)+])−1
, which can be directly extended
from [24]. Thus, we have the following relation(
Es,SCSITb
N0
)
R1, min
=
ln2
λmax(KH1 −KH2)
≥
ln2
EH 1,H2
[(
λmax(H 1H H1 −H 2H H2 )
)+] =
(
Es,FCSITb
N0
)
R1, min
,
(25)
where
(
Es,FCSITb
N0
)
R1, min
denotes the optimal energy efficiency for secrecy communication with full CSIT
(FCSIT). The inequality in (25) comes from the fact that the maximum eigenvalue of a symmetric matrix
is convex [26, Ch. 3] and followed by applying the Jensen’s inequality. The above inequality shows that
the lack of CSIT indeed increases the energy expenditure.
Note that the discussions here not only indicate the relations of different communication systems in
terms of the best energy efficiency but also provides an quantitative description for these systems. Therefore
we can observe the impacts much more clearly.
VII. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we compare the rate regions solving from our proposed iterative algorithm and the
achievable transmission scheme in Lemma 4 under both Rayleigh and Rician fading channels to that of
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the MGBC-CM with full CSIT, respectively. We set nT = 2 and the power constraint PT = 10, respectively.
The variances of all noises are set as 1. We also set the stopping criteria of the iterative algorithm as
δ1 = δ2 = δ3 = δ4 = δ5 = 10−3. In the numerical simulation of fast Rayleigh fading case, we set the
covariance matrices of the two channels as
KH1 =

 0.2 0
0 0.04

 , KH2 =

 0.1 0.08
0.08 0.1

 , (26)
which satisfy Lemma 2. For the full CSIT case, we consider the rate region which is the convex closure
of the following rate pair
Rpi1 ≤ E
[(
log2
1+H Hpi1KU pi1 H pi1
1+H Hpi2KU pi1 H pi2
)+]
, (27)
Rpi2 ≤ E
[(
log2
[1+H Hpi2(KU pi1 +KU pi2 )H pi2 ](1+H
H
pi1KU pi1 H pi1)
[1+H Hpi1(KU pi1 +KU pi2 )H pi1 ](1+H
H
pi2KU pi1 H pi2)
)+]
, (28)
with the power constraint tr(KU pi1 +KU pi2 )≤ 10, where the optimal KU pi1 and KU pi2 are described in [15,
(16)] and the optimal b is as
b = KU pi1 H pi1H
H
pi1/(1+H
H
pi1KU pi1 H pi1). (29)
Note that (27) and (28) are the straightforward extension from [15] to the fast fading channels with full
CSIT. From Fig. 3 we can easily see that both the proposed iterative algorithm and the transmission
scheme in Lemma 4 for the fast FMGBC-CM with partial CSIT apparently outperform the time sharing
scheme. Time sharing means that the transmitter sends the two messages with different powers during a
fraction of time where these powers satisfy the average power constraint. And in each fraction of time,
the fast FMGBC-CM reduces to a fast fading Gaussian MISO wiretap channel. From this figure we can
also find that the proposed transmission scheme proposed in Lemma 4 performs better than the iterative
algorithm when the ratio of the two users’ secrecy rates is large enough. This is because the iterative
algorithm may result in local optimal, which may be worse than the proposed transmission scheme. On
the other hand, by comparing the regions of full and partial CSIT cases, we can easily find the impact of
the knowledge of CSIT to the rate performance. That is, without full knowledge of CSI, the transmitter is
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not able to design signal directions and do power allocation efficiently. More specifically, by comparing
(11)(12) and (27)(28), respectively, we can easily see that the operation (.)+ in the former case is outside
the expectation but the later is inside. This is because in the former case power and direction of channel
input signals are fixed and used for all channel realizations. Thus the rate loss is inevitable. Similar
phenomenon also emerges in [10] [27].
For the Rician fading case, in addition to (26), we let the mean vectors of H 1 and H 2 as
µ1 = [0.7, 0.1]T , µ2 = [0.1, 0.6]T ,
respectively. From Fig. 4, we can easily see that the CSIT plays an important role in improving the rate
region in this case. And time sharing is still the worst. Note that in this case, the proposed transmission
scheme in Lemma 4 also overwhelms the iterative algorithm much more apparently than that in Rayleigh
fading case. With the aid of line of sight, the performances of all schemes under Rician fading are much
better than those under Rayleigh fading. To illustrate the performance of b solved from Table I, in Fig. 5 we
compare the case where b is derived from substituting H 1 = µ1 into b = THpi1H pi1H
H
pi1/(1+H
H
pi1KU pi1 H pi1),
which is worse than with b solved from Table I. On the other hand, due to the performance gap is small,
when the complexity is concerned in practical design, the transmitter may choose this b which is not from
iterative solving to implement the secure LA-GPC. Furthermore, we also show the rate region derived by
b = [0 0], which is the same as treating interference as noise. This method is still worse than the proposed
method, but slightly better than the time sharing.
In Fig. 6 and Fig. 7 we compare the rate regions with different transmit SNRs under both Rayleigh
and Rician fading channels. It can be seen that the rate regions of both methods enlarge with increasing
transmit SNR. Thus we conjecture that the rate region enlarges with increasing transmit power. Note that
this phenomenon is not trivial for the wiretap channel, not to mention the more complicated FM-GBCCM.
This is because that when the transmit power increases, both the SNRs at the legitimate receiver and the
eavesdropper increase. Then the secrecy rate may not always increase with increasing transmit power.
Counter examples are given [28] [13]. Indeed, the monotonically increasing property for secrecy rate
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(with respect to the transmit power) was also examined in [12, Sec V]. As described in the Remark of
[12, P.1181], whether the monotonically increasing properties are valid or not in some general cases are
still unknown.
Also note that compared to the beamformer selection (15) and (16), the iterative algorithm seems to
have worse performance with increasing transmit SNR. However, the relation reverses when the transmit
SNR is small enough. This may imply the advantage of iterative algorithm used in low transmit SNR. In
addition, to see the convergence speed of the proposed iterative algorithm, in Fig. 8 we show the rates of
R1 and R2 versus the number of iteration times. In this case we set the transmit power PT = 10 and the
power ratio of user 1 as α = 0.5, and the channel statistics for Rayleigh and Rician cases are the same
as those in Fig. 3 and Fig. 4, respectively. Numerical results show that the iterative algorithm converges
within 5 steps. Note that although the proposed algorithm is in the form of fixed point iteration, the
complicated formula hinders us to verify the convergence property by [29].
Finally, we compare the performances of our proposed iterative algorithm with whom combines the
common way of finding the boundary of rate regions [30] with the modified version of our iterative
algorithm. That is, given µ ∈ [0,∞), we solve (α∗,b∗,K∗U pi1 ,K
∗
U pi2
) from the optimization problem
max Rpi1UB +µRpi2UB
s.t. KU pi1  0, KU pi2  0 and tr(KU pi1 )≤ αPT , KU pi2 ≤ (1−α)PT . (30)
The rate region is the union of
(
Rpi1UB
(
α∗,b∗,K∗U pi1 ,K
∗
U pi2
)
,Rpi2UB
(
α∗,b∗,K∗U pi1 ,K
∗
U pi2
))
for all µ∈ [0,∞).
Note that via K.K.T. we use an algorithm similar to that depicted in Fig. 2 to solve (30). In Fig. 9, we
compare both methods under fast Rayleigh fading channels with PT = 10. From the figure, we can find
that our proposed iterative algorithm outperforms solving (30).
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper we considered the secure transmission over the fast fading multiple antenna Gaussian
broadcast channels with confidential messages (FMGBC-CM), where a multiple-antenna transmitter sends
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independent confidential messages to two users with information theoretic secrecy and only the statistics
of the receivers’ channel state information are known at the transmitter. We first used the same marginal
property of the FMGBC-CM to derive the conditions that the channels not degraded to the common
wiretap ones. We then derived the achievable rate region for the FMGBC-CM by solving the channel input
covariance matrices and the inflation factor. We also proposed an iterative algorithm to solve the channel
input covariance matrices and the inflation factor. Due to the complicated rate region formulae in normal
SNR, we provided a low SNR analysis for finding the asymptotic property of the channel. Numerical
examples demonstrated that both users can achieve positive rates simultaneously under the information-
theoretic secrecy requirement. Numerical examples also show the proposed beamformer selection and
iterative algorithm may outperform each other under different conditions.
IX. APPENDIX: PROOF OF LEMMA 3
Proof: To avoid the abuse of notations, in the proof, we assume the message of User 1 is encoded
first without loss of generality. We first derive each part of (11) from (4) and (5) in the following
I(V 1;Y2|V 2,H 2) =h(Y2|V 2,H 2)−h(Y2|V 1,V 2,H 2) = h(H 2HU 1+Z2)−h(Z2)=EH 2
[
log(1+H 2HKU 1H 2)
]
,
I(V 1;V 2) =h(V 1)−H(V 1|V 2) = h(U ′1 +bU 2)−h(U ′1) = log |I+bKU 2b
H |,
I(V 1;Y1|H 1) =h(H 1H(U 1 +U 2)+Z1)−h(H 1H(U 1 +U 2)+Z1|U ′1 +bU 2,H 1)
=h(H 1H(U 1+U 2)+Z1)−h(H1H(U 1 +U 2)− sH(U ′1 +bU 2)+Z1|U ′1 +bU 2,H 1) (31)
=h(H 1H(U 1 +U 2)+Z1)−h(H 1H(U 1 +U 2)− sH(U ′1 +bU 2)+Z1|H 1) (32)
=EH1
[
log(1+H 1H(KU 1 +KU 2)H 1)
− log(1+H 1H(KU 1 +KU 2)H 1−H 1
H(T1 +KU 2b
H)(I+bKU 2b
H)−1(TH1 +bKU 2)H 1)
]
,
(33)
where in (31), s is chosen so that H 1H(U 1 +U 2)+ Z1 − sH(U ′1 + bU 2) is independent of U ′1 + bU 2.
To achieve this, the selected s is the MMSE estimator of x = H 1H(U 1 +U 2)+Z1 given the observation
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y = U ′1 +bU 2, i.e., sH = H 1H(T1 +KU 2bH)(I+bKU 2bH)−1. Substitute this value of sH into (32), and
after some arrangement we can get (33). Combining the above and using the fact that
det

 A B
C D

= det(A)det(D−CA−1B) for nonsingular A, we can obtain that
R1 ≤(I(V 1;Y1|H 1)− I(V 1;Y2|V 2,H 2)− I(V 1;V 2))+
=
(
EH1
[
log(1+H 1H(KU 1 +KU 2)H 1) (34)
− log(1+H 1H(KU 1 +KU 2)H 1−H 1
H(T1 +KU 2b
H)(I+bKU 2b
H)−1(TH1 +bKU 2)H 1)
]
−EH 2
[
log(1+H 2HKU 1H 2)
]
− log |I+bKU 2b
H |
)+
=
(
EH1[log(1+H 1
H(KU 1 +KU 2)H 1)]−EH2[log(1+H 2
HKU 1H 2)]−
EH1

log
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
I+bKU 2bH (TH1 +bKU 2)H 1
H 1H(T1 +KU 2bH) 1+H 1H(KU 1 +KU 2)H 1
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣


)+
. (35)
Similarly, we can get (12) which completes the proof of Lemma 3.
X. APPENDIX: PROOF OF LEMMA 4
Proof: Instead of solving KU pi1 and KU pi2 from (11) and (12) directly, which may be intractable, we
resort to solving the upper bound (UB) of the rate region described by Lemma 3. That is, the transmitter
can use full CSIT to design the inflation factor. Then it is clear that the solution of KU pi1 and KU pi2 is
suboptimal for (11) and (12). Note also that the optimal b for the UB is the MMSE estimator shown in
(29). Note that (29) comes from that b= aH Hpi1 and a is the MMSE estimator of U ′pi1 given the observation
ypi1 = H
H
pi1Tpi1U
′
pi1 + zpi1 .
With this choice of b, we can eliminate the interference perfectly by DPC. Thus we have the following
rate
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region UB
(Rpi1,Rpi2)UB ∈ co
{
⋃
0≤α≤1
R (KU pi1 ,KU pi2 )
}
,
(36)
where Rpi1 and Rpi2 have the same forms as the RHS of (27) and (28), respectively, except KU pi1 and KU pi2 .
This is because in (27) and (28), KU pi1 and KU pi2 depend on H pi1 and H pi2 , respectively, due to full CSIT.
But in our model, KU pi1 and KU pi2 only depends on the statistics of the channels.
After applying Jensen’s inequality to (27), we can derive the UB of R1 as
R1 ≤
(
E
[
log
1+H pi1HKU pi1 H pi1
1+H pi2
HKU pi1 H pi2
])+
(a)
=
(
E
[
log
|I+Hpi1H pi1HKU pi1 |
|I+Hpi2H pi2
HKU pi1 |
])+
(b)
∼=
(
log
|E[I+H pi1H pi1 HKU pi1 ]|
|E[I+H pi2H pi2 HKU pi1 ]|
)+
(c)
=
(
log
|I+(KHpi1 +µpi1µ
H
pi1)KU pi1 |
|I+(KHpi2 +µpi2µ
H
pi2)KU pi1 |
)+
, (37)
where (a) follows from the Sylvester’s determinant theorem |Im +Am×nBn×m| = |In +Bn×mAm×n|, and
(b) is due to the fact that the function log |X| is concave of X. Finally, (c) is due to E[H pi1H pi1 H ] =
KHpi1 +µpi1µ
H
pi1 . Note that the RHS of the equality (c) is the same as the secrecy capacity of a multiple-input
multiple-output multiple-antenna eavesdropper’s channel matrices with equivalent main and eavesdropper
channels as (KHpi1 + µpi1µ
H
pi1)
1/2 and (KHpi2 + µpi2µ
H
pi2)
1/2
, respectively. And for that channel the general
optimal input covariance matrix is unknown. Partial results can be referred to [31]. Here we adopt the
beamformer (rank-1) as the input covariance matrix, i.e., KU pi1 = αPepi1eHpi1 , where ||epi1||2 = 1. Then we
can further rearrange (37) as
R1 ≤
(
log
|I+(KHpi1 +µpi1µ
H
pi1)KU pi1 |
|I+(KHpi2 +µpi2µ
H
pi2)KU pi1 |
)+
=
(
log
|I+αP(KHpi1 +µpi1µ
H
pi1)epi1e
H
pi1 |
|I+αP(KHpi2 +µpi2µ
H
pi2)epi1e
H
pi1 |
)+
=
(
log
eHpi1(I+αP(KHpi1 +µpi1µ
H
pi1))epi1
eHpi1(I+αP(KHpi2 +µpi2µ
H
pi2))epi1
)+
. (38)
Since (38) is the Rayleigh quotient, it is known that the optimal epi1 is the eigenvector corresponding to
the maximum generalized eigenvalue of
(
I+αP(KHpi1 +µpi1µ
H
pi1) , I+αP(KHpi2 +µpi2µ
H
pi2)
)
.
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Following the similar logic, we can derive the UB of R2 by
R2 ≤
(
E
[
log
[1+Hpi2 H(KU pi1 +KU pi2 )H pi2 ][1+Hpi1
HKU pi1 H pi1 ]
[1+Hpi1 H(KU pi1 +KU pi2 )H pi1 ][1+Hpi2
HKU pi1 H pi2 ]
])+
(a)
∼=
(
log
E[1+H pi2
H(KU pi1 +KU pi2 )H pi2]E[1+H pi1
HKU pi1 H pi1]
E[1+H pi1H(KU pi1 +KU pi2 )H pi1]E[1+H pi2
HKU pi1 H pi2]
)+
=
(
log
([
1+
E[H pi2
HKU pi2 H pi2]
1+E[H pi2HKU pi1 H pi2 ]
]/[
1+
E[H pi1
HKU pi2 H pi1 ]
1+E[Hpi1 HKU pi1 H pi1]
]))+
(b)
=
(
log
([
1+
E[H pi2
HKU pi2 H pi2]
1+αPeHpi1(KHpi2 +µpi2µ
H
pi2)epi1
]/[
1+
E[H pi1
HKU pi2 H pi1]
1+αPeHpi1(KHpi1 +µpi1µ
H
pi1)epi1
]))+
=
(
log
(
E
[
1+
H pi2
HKU pi2 H pi2
1+αPeHpi1(KHpi2 +µpi2µ
H
pi2)epi1
]/
E
[
1+
H pi1
HKU pi2 H pi1
1+αPeHpi1(KHpi1 +µpi1µ
H
pi1)epi1
]))+
(c)
=
(
log
(∣∣∣∣∣I+ (KHpi2 +µpi2µ
H
pi2)KU pi2
1+αPeHpi1(KHpi2 +µpi2µ
H
pi2)epi1
∣∣∣∣∣
/∣∣∣∣∣I+ (KHpi1 +µpi1µ
H
pi1)KU pi2
1+αPeHpi1(KHpi1 +µpi1µ
H
pi1)epi1
∣∣∣∣∣
))+
. (39)
Note that (a) is by applying the Jensen’s inequality to both the numerator and denominator inside
the logarithm and (b) comes from substituting KU pi1 = αPepi1eHpi1 . In (c) we use again the Sylvester’s
determinant theorem.
Again, let KU pi2 = (1−α)Pepi2e
H
pi2 , with ||epi2||
2 = 1, we have
R2 ≤

log
∣∣∣I+ (KHpi2+µpi2µHpi2 )KUpi21+αPeHpi1 (KHpi2+µpi2µHpi2)epi1
∣∣∣∣∣∣I+ (KHpi1+µpi1µHpi1 )KUpi21+αPeHpi1 (KHpi1+µpi1µHpi1)epi1
∣∣∣


+
=

log
eHpi2
(
I+
(1−α)P(KHpi2+µpi2µ
H
pi2 )
1+αPeHpi1(KHpi2+µpi2µ
H
pi2 )epi1
)
epi2
eHpi2
(
I+
(1−α)P(KHpi1+µpi1µ
H
pi1 )
1+αPeHpi1(KHpi1+µpi1µ
H
pi1 )epi1
)
epi2


+
(40)
And the optimal epi2 is the eigenvector corresponding to the maximum generalized eigenvalue of(
I+
(1−α)P(KHpi2 +µpi2µ
H
pi2)
1+αPeHpi1(KHpi2 +µpi2µ
H
pi2)epi1
, I+
(1−α)P(KHpi1 +µpi1µ
H
pi1)
1+αPeHpi1(KHpi1 +µpi1µ
H
pi1)epi1
)
.
XI. APPENDIX: PROOF OF LEMMA 5
In the proof, we first transform the unknown variables to be solved from KU pik to Tpik by the decompo-
sition KU pi1 = Tpi1T
H
pi1 and KU pi2 = Tpi2T
H
pi2 , such that the Lagrangians can be simplified. And the resulting
Lagrangians are
L1(b,Tpi1), R
UB
pi1 +λ1
(
tr(KU pi1 )−αPT
)
, L2(Tpi2), R
UB
pi2 +λ2
(
tr(KU pi2 )− (1−α)PT
)
,
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where λ1 and λ2 are the Lagrangian multipliers. Note that with the above decompositions, the conditions
that KU pi1  0, KU pi2  0 are automatically satisfied.
Next, we calculate some derivatives that would be used for the optimization problem. For ∂L1/∂b = 0,
we get ∂EHpi1 [log |M|]/∂b = 0, where M is defined in (14), and
d EHpi1 [log |M|]
(a)
=EHpi1 [tr(M
−1dM)] (b)= EHpi1

tr

M−1

 (db)KU pi2 b
H+bKU pi2(db)
H (db)KU pi2H pi1
H Hpi1KU pi2 (db)
H 0






(c)
=EHpi1

tr

M−1



 (db)KU pi2 b
H (db)KU pi2 H pi1
0 0

+

 bKU pi2 (db)
H 0
H Hpi1KU pi2 (db)
H 0







 ,
where (a) is from d log |X| = tr(X−1dX), and ∂ log |X|/∂X = (XT )−1, (b) comes from some derivatives
calculation [32] [33] and (c) is from the facts that tr(A+B) = tr(A)+ tr(B).
Therefore, we have
∂EHpi1 [log |M|]
∂b = EHpi1


[
I 0
]
M−H

 b
H Hpi1

KU pi2

= 0.
After some manipulations, it can be proved that without loss of generality, the solution of b satisfies the
form described in Lemma 5, even when |KU pi2 |= 0.
To compute ∂L1/∂Tpi1 = 0 and ∂L2/∂Tpi2 = 0, with similar steps described above, we can have the final
results.
XII. APPENDIX: PROOF OF LEMMA 6
Proof: We can easily observe that the function including b in our rate formulae, i.e., the second term
on the RHS of (13), has the same form as in [32, (1)]. Then from [32, Sec. IV-B], we know that when
P → 0, the optimal inflation factor in our problem is boptimal = 0. That is, treating interference as noise
directly. Substituting b = 0 into Lemma 3, the achievable rate-region becomes
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R j≤

EH j [log(1+HHj(KU j+KU jc )H j)]−EH jc [log(1+H HjcKU jH jc)]−EH j

log
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
I THj H j
H Hj T j 1+H Hj(KU j+KU jc )H j
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣




+
.
(41)
Besides, from block matrix determinant, we can get∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
I TH1 H 1
H H1 T1 1+H 1H(KU 1 +KU 2)H 1
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
= 1+H H1 KU 2H 1. (42)
Let KU 1 = αPT K1 and KU 2 = (1−α)PT K2, where we define tr(K1) = tr(K2) = 1. Then with j = 1,
(41) becomes
R1 ≤
(
EH1[log(1+PT H 1
H(αK1 +(1−α)K2)H 1)]−EH2[log(1+PT H 2
H(αK1)H 2)]
−EH1 [log(1+PT H 1
H(1−α)K2H 1)] )+ (43)
∼=
( PT
ln2 ( EH1[H
H
1 (αK1+(1−α)K2)H 1]−EH2[H 2
H(αK1)H 2]−EH1[H 1
H(1−α)K2H 1] )
)+
(44)
=
(
PT
ln2
(
EH1[H
H
1 (αK1)H 1]−EH2 [H
H
2 (αK1)H 2]
))+
, (45)
where (44) utilizes limx→0 ln(1+ax) = ax+O(x).
Similarly, we can derive R2 as
R2 ∼=
(
PT
ln2
(
EH2 [H
H
2 ((1−α)K2)H 2]−EH1[H
H
1 ((1−α)K2)H 1]
))+
. (46)
Since R1 and R2 have similar structures, in the following we only derive R1, and the results can be
easily extended to R2. Let H 1 = K1/2H1 ψ1 and H 2 = K
1/2
H2 ψ2, where ψ1 ∼CN(0,I),ψ2 ∼CN(0,I). Then
(45) can be written as
R1 ∼=
(
αPT
ln2
(
Eψ1,ψ2
[
ψH1 K
1/2
H1 K1K
1/2
H1 ψ1−ψ
H
2 K
1/2
H2 K1K
1/2
H2 ψ2
]))+
=
(
αPT
ln2
(
tr
(
K1/2H1 K1K
1/2
H1
)
− tr
(
K1/2H2 K1K
1/2
H2
)))+
(47)
=
(
αPT
ln2
tr((KH1 −KH2)K1)
)+
(48)
≤
(
αPT
ln2 λmax(KH1 −KH2)
)+
, (49)
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where (47) is uses the properties tr(AB) = tr(BA) and ψ1 and ψ2 are i.i.d. with covariance matrix I;
(48) uses the properties tr(AB) = tr(BA) again. Finally, (49) comes from the result of Lemma 7 which
completes the proof.
XIII. APPENDIX: PROOF OF LEMMA 7
Proof: Let the eigen-decompositions A = UAΛAUHA and M = UMΛMUHM, where UA and UM are
unitary matrices and ΛA = diag(a1,a2, ..,an) and ΛM = diag(m1,m2, ...,mn) with a1 ≥ a2 ≥ ...≥ an, m1 ≥
m2 ≥ ...≥ mn ≥ 0 and ∑i mi ≤ 1. Then
tr(AM) = tr(UAΛAUHAUMΛMUHM) = tr(UHMUAΛAUHAUMΛM) = tr(UΛAUHΛM) = tr(SΛM),
where U , UHAUM is an unitary matrix, and thus S =UΛAUH is Hermitian. Let si be the i-th diagonal ele-
ment. Hence, tr(AM) = tr(SΛM) = ∑i simi ≤maxi(si). The equality holds if mk = 1, where k = argmaxi si.
Thus the optimal M is unit rank.
In the following, we solve the eigenvector of the optimal M. By the Schur-Horn Theorem [34, Chapter
9] and recall that S = UΛAUH , we know maxi si ≤maxi ai. As a result, we get that S = UΛAUH = ΛA
is optimal. This happens when U = UHAUM = I, that is, UM = UA.
From the above, we know that the eigenvector of the optimal M is the one corresponding to the
maximum eigenvalue of A.
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Fig. 2. The flow chart of the proposed algorithm.
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Fig. 3. The comparison of rate regions under fast Rayleigh fading channel with full and statistical CSIT.
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Fig. 4. The comparison of rate regions under fast Rician fading channel with full and statistical CSIT.
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Fig. 5. The effect of different choices of b for the proposed transmission scheme under fast Rician fading channel and statistical CSIT.
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